FEB 14 — This article is the second in a series that examines two major developments in Malaysian politics and the links between them. The first article dealt with the new approach to politicising religion favoured by the right-wing of Umno and their fellow travellers. 

The goals of the old and new religious politics remain the same: swaying the Malay vote which remains electorally decisive. However, rather than focusing on a competition for credentials within Islam (eg. PAS vs Umno), this new religious politics simultaneously victimises minority religions whilst casting them as aggressors in order to foster false anxiety amongst Malay Muslims. 

Besides being unjust, the new religious politics opens the way for a fresh fault line in inter-communal relations. There is a clear social danger if the party in control of government is profiting from harassment of minorities and violent attacks upon their places of worship.

Our opposition parties have objected to this trend in politics but have yet to produce a robust counter-strategy.

Let us consider what effect the Kajang by-election may have, if any, on this major political trend in Malaysia. 

The analysis presented here is my personal opinion based on my work with the Selangor State government (2008-2013), with PKR, and personal observations.

The 'Kajang move'

The move to field Pakatan Rakyat leader Anwar Ibrahim as a candidate for the Selangor state seat of Kajang has created a stir. Known now as the "Kajang move" this gambit was, by his own admission, conceived by PKR Election Strategist Rafizi Ramli.

On 27 January, PKR ADUN Lee Chin Cheh tendered his resignation from the state seat of Kajang. Rumours soon emerged that Anwar Ibrahim would be the new Pakatan Rakyat candidate for the seat. This was subsequently confirmed by Rafizi in his article "The Kajang Move: A Game-Changer for Putrajaya" on January 29.

The advantages and disadvantages of surprise

Reportedly conceived within the space of two weeks, the "Kajang move" surprised almost all observers. With so little notice given, and no immediate explanation, some of that surprise naturally translated into negative reactions. 

An initial round of critics from civil society condemned the move as "undemocratic" as it removed a duly-elected representative by party fiat.

Such criticism would hold more weight if the retiring representative in question was voted in on the basis of their personal charismatic appeal or historical connection with Kajang voters. 

In the case of Lee Chin Cheh, this does not appear to be the case. Lee is a first-time politician who was nominated quite late to the Kajang seat during the 2013 General Election (GE), replacing the popular "Cikgu" Lee Kim Sin, also from PKR. Nonetheless, despite a six-corner electoral contest, Lee Chin Cheh emerged with a 6,824-vote majority.

I find it more reasonable to conclude that the majority of voters in Kajang behaved like most other Malaysian voters: by favouring the party ticket over personality.

The criticism that the "Kajang move" was equivalent to ex-DAP representative Hee Yit Foong’s 2009 defection in Perak is more far-fetched. Hee crossed party lines to become a "BN-friendly independent" and helped topple a (slim) majority government. That genuinely represented a betrayal of the voters and voter anger was clearly shown in their behaviour towards Hee and her office. That anger appears totally absent in Kajang today.

In the Kajang 2014 case voters are being inconvenienced with having to vote again 10 months after the general election. However, they are being offered a senior candidate – the most senior candidate – from the same party ticket. It remains their democratic prerogative to either punish or support Rafizi’s strategy to place Anwar in Kajang.

This sort of tactic is certainly not a move that PKR can afford to make into a habit lest the goodwill of its supporters and allies wear thin. 

The surprise nature of the "Kajang move" has been apologetically justified by Rafizi as a means to seize the political initiative from the Umno right and divert their assault on minorities. 

My own initial reaction was disappointment that PKR did not invest more energy and time in preparing the public with the need for the move. 

However, I must concede that Barisan Nasional (BN) was caught off-guard and likely remains uncertain how to proceed. This no doubt explains the Election Commission’s (EC) decision to set the by-election date a substantial 55 days after Lee’s resignation. BN has nearly two months to bring to bear the advantages it enjoys from incumbency of government, control of the media, and superior financial resources.

Keeping BN off balance and deprived of momentum helps offset its advantages. This is strategically desirable if Umno and its tactics of incitement are to be stopped.

Rafizi’s swiftness of action could readily be interpreted by sceptics as arrogance. However, Rafizi has done something few other Malaysian politicians have done. He has apologised sincerely for his brisk actions, albeit in a cautious and carefully-worded statement, and submitted himself to the public’s questions in a forum last Wednesday.

I believe that the "Kajang move" will be judged on how well the chosen means meet publicly-beneficial ends. 

This means that its ultimate valuation will be retrospective. The balance of outcomes involves a complex mix of the conduct and result of the by-election, subsequent political changes in Selangor, and any resulting policy initiatives.

Let us consider these in more detail.

The by-election campaign

The EC’s decision to set the by-election date on March 23 signals a lack of decisiveness and momentum on BN’s part. There was initial debate in BN on which component party would contest the seat. Whilst resolved in favour of MCA, the traditional contestant, there are upstarts from Umno – the daughter of Home Minister Zahid Hamidi no less – who have expressed interest in contesting.

On the Pakatan side, the top leadership of all three parties have presented a united front backing Anwar in Kajang. However, PAS Selangor has voiced objections to Anwar seeking the Menteri Besar post, they have instead their state party chair and current senior State Executive Councillor (EXCO) Iskandar Abdul Samad. Iskandar for his part appears to have projected a noncommittal stance. It remains unclear if this stance is a continuation of a dispute raised during GE2013.

Seat disputes between PKR and a dissident faction of PAS Selangor led to a multi-corner fight in the Kota Damansara state seat during GE2013. The split in support led to PKR losing the seat to BN. The result was that for Selangor Pakatan’s seat breakdown was 15 seats to DAP, 15 to PAS, and 14 to PKR.

In spite of having one less seat than its coalition members PKR’s nominee for Menteri Besar, Tan Sri Khalid Ibrahim, received unanimous support from PAS and DAP.

In terms of the internal balance of power within Pakatan Rakyat this produced a situation where each component party led at least one state. As the fate of MIC, MCA, and Gerakan within BN attests, a balanced coalition is a functional one.

Any dissident faction within PAS Selangor is unlikely to find support for a PAS-led government from its coalition members, let alone its party leadership. Despite their support for Pakatan Rakyat I find it unlikely that the multicultural public of Selangor would be in favour of a PAS-led state government.

Returning to the by-election proper, it has to be noted that Anwar is exposing himself to risk. While I expect the result of the by-election to be in his favour one cannot rule out untoward events and actions from BN. Mitigating against this is the rumoured effort within Umno to topple Prime Minister Najib Razak.

Were Anwar to lose the by-election it would be a serious blow to his credibility as Pakatan leader and its candidate for Prime Minister. 

Although by-elections do not exactly recreate the conditions surrounding a general election, comparisons will still be drawn. Voter turnout during by-elections can be greater or lesser than at a general election, sentiment may shift depending on the current and prior candidate, and – since this is Malaysia – the raft of goodies handed out or promised by either side may affect the vote.

Winning with less than Lee Chin Cheh’s 6,824-vote majority will be spun for a time as a sign of Anwar’s diminished appeal. In any case, a win with a greater or lesser margin will soon become a historical footnote in light of subsequent political moves within Selangor.

Selangor leadership

Anwar’s senior position as PKR "de facto leader" (Ketua Umum) and Pakatan Rakyat chief has naturally led to speculation as to what position he would hold in Selangor state were he to secure election as its newest assemblyperson.

Should Anwar win the by-election there are only four possible positions open to him: 1) a backbencher in the State Assembly; 2) a member of the State Executive Council (EXCO); 3) Deputy Menteri Besar, if he is made an EXCO; or, 4) to assume the Menteri Besar position itself.

The first option can be dismissed as being too insignificant a platform for a veteran politician such as Anwar. The remaining three options require the assent of His Royal Highness the Sultan of Selangor, following Articles 51 and 53 of the state constitution.

The role of the palace

There appears to be clear desire on the part of both Anwar and Rafizi to avoid the impression that they could be dictating the choice of Menteri Besar to the Palace.

The more republican-minded may quibble this point, but it is a fact that Malaysia remains a Constitutional monarchy at federal and (within the peninsula) state levels. Although curbed by Mahathir Mohamad, the monarchy has since gradually expanded its influence in politics. The most significant case of this was the role of the palace in the Perak Constitutional coup in 2009.

Movements such as BERSIH have affirmed the political and Constitutional legitimacy of the royalty by choosing the royal yellow as their colour. 

By its own design, and through invitation by a civil society frustrated with government, the monarchy is reasserting itself within Malaysian politics. Constitutional scholars may debate the legitimacy of this move, but it is a fact of contemporary politics.

Constitutionally, the Sultan must appoint as Menteri Besar a member of the state Legislative Assembly who commands the confidence of the majority of its members. 

While a state-level consensus amongst Pakatan as to who should be Menteri Besar is eminently desirable, it is possible for PKR and DAP together to carry the majority in the Assembly with their 29 seats out a total of 56. DAP has voiced unqualified support for Anwar’s candidacy in Kajang. Should any difference of opinion in PAS Selangor continue it is still possible that their representatives will vote differently. However, unanimity would be desirable for long-term political stability.

Installing a new Menteri Besar would likely mean that the current State EXCO would have to resign along with the current MB pursuant to Article 53(6). The Sultan can only dissolve the Legislative Assembly and initiate fresh state elections if the current MB requests it. I expect that the EXCO lineup will remain relatively unchanged.

A new Menteri Besar?

Most speculation, and the intimations of PKR leaders, have focused on the prospect that Anwar take over the Menteri Besar position from Khalid Ibrahim.

It is this gambit, rather than the replacement of Lee Chin Cheh, that has generated the most controversy. 

I will examine the possible consolidation of power within Selangor and PKR in my next part.

* Part 1 of this article can be found here.

** This is the personal opinion of the columnist.