FEB 10 — In this series of two articles, I propose to take a critical look at PKR’s “Kajang move,” its potential virtues and shortcomings. Since its principle architect Rafizi Ramli has set the gambit within the strategic context of the next general election, I will also examine the longer-term political trends that it seeks to address.

This first article looks at the bigger picture and the emergence of a new confrontational politics of religion and race. The second article assesses the Kajang move in light of this phenomenon and other political factors.

Although affiliated with PKR through my work, I do not claim any insider knowledge of the gambit. This article is being written to further public understanding of the dynamics of the Kajang move: while I welcome its benefits, there have been clear shortcomings in its execution and communication.

Political January

For some years now, January has been a one-sided affair in Malaysian politics. Since the 2008 general elections there has been a near annual tradition of violent attacks on places of worship. Churches have been fire bombed, Bibles seized, a gurdwara was stoned, and pig heads have been lobbed into a surau.

Seemingly the act of a few agent provocateurs, Malaysians have kept their cool, although sentiments may have soured with the continued friction around the legitimate use of “Allah.”

The attacks appear linked to the increasing stridency of conservative and right-wing Peninsula politics that is associated with the greater role given to religious identity over ethnicity or race by Umno, Perkasa, and their fellow travellers in other parties.

Let me be clear here, the political motivations are primary. Religion, ethnicity, or race are merely the uniforms that politics dons in order to enter the field of battle.

The roots of religious politicisation

The roots of the politicisation of religious identity go back to the rivalry between Umno and PAS for the ethnic Malay vote, which has been particularly pronounced since the 1980s.

Each party attempted to burnish its religious credentials. PAS was goaded by Umno into promoting the more extreme forms of hudud law, which contributed to the breakdown of PAS’s alliance with DAP in the early 1990s. The commitment of PAS to an Islamic state led to another split with DAP by the late 1990s as their Barisan Alternatif ruptured on this issue.

Umno, on the other hand, used its control of government to vastly expand the powers of religious policing and the politicisation of religious institutions; thus, creating an Islamicised state, if not an Islamic one. Under Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s leadership, it also sought to effectively transform Sabah from a Christian bumiputera state into a “Malay” (i.e. Muslim bumiputera)-dominated state, by combining immigration with conversion.

This early form of religious-based political competition depended more on one-upmanship between rival contenders for Islamic authority, rather than a negative politics preying on fear and anxiety between religions.

A politics of insecurity

There seems to have been a shift from Umno’s earlier mode of preaching inter-ethnic resentment whilst embracing a pragmatic multi-culturalism, to a mode where political arrogance and Umno’s confidence of gains has inspired it to pursue strategies that end up weakening its coalition partners. Let me examine the reasons.

Even during its moderate phases, Umno’s brand of ethnic politics has always contained an element of competitive insecurity. Prior to the Malayan Union, the branch of Malay nationalism that would later form Umno built its case on the perceived demographic threat posed to Malays from other ethnic groups; i.e. Malays were in danger of being outnumbered by socially aggressive immigrants.

The very rationale for the Alliance and its successor, the Barisan Nasional, was “unity in enmity.”

Pragmatically speaking, Umno was obliged to engage in coalition politics with other race-based parties in order to secure government. Each party claimed to stand for their narrow ethno-racial interests whilst co-operating to serve a greater national agenda.

They upheld a line promulgated in the colonial era, that Malayans were composed of distinct groups who had more to fear from each other on the basis of communalism than their political and economic masters.

The very formation of Malaysia, from the union of Sabah, Sarawak, Singapore, and Malaya, was undercut by the demographic anxiety to counter ethnic Chinese numbers. This was done by combining the Peninsular Malays with the natives of Sabah and Sarawak to form a numerically superior bumiputera demographic.

The strong allure of ethnicity or religion as a political identity is not a natural condition. It requires political engineering and constant stimulation in order to overcome more spontaneous forms of solidarity and association that might undermine the case that other ethnicities or religions are to be feared and avoided.

The early engineering of ethnic tension in Malaya took place in the colonial period. British rule in Malaya emphasised race or ethnicity in official depictions of the population via the census. In India, the British prioritised religious identity in their censuses, particularly the Hindu-Muslim distinction.

While they were not the only contributing factor, the demographic information in the censuses channelled the thinking of political elites into a drama of minorities versus majorities, to create ethnic divisions. The result was that Malaya became ensnared in a politics of race and the South Asian sub-continent was split into India and Pakistan.

Indian-Pakistani Partition was a horrific experience. Families who had been neighbours for generations slaughtered each other overnight because they had learned to see each other politically as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and so forth rather than as Indians with a common history and destiny.

Umno is an ethnically-exclusive party that justifies its existence based on protecting Malays from the threat posed by other ethnic groups. Therefore, Umno needs to ensure that its ethnic base continues to affirm its collective existence as well as remaining dependent on the party.

In practical terms, this has meant that there is an agenda to lead the Malay community to understand “Malayness” as a political identity, rather than a merely social and cultural one. This requires that the bases of inter-ethnic fear and anxiety are constantly stimulated. If the Enemy is ever present, the Protector will never run out of a job.

The primary strategic rationale behind the “Allah” issue is to break down solidarity between Malaysians. It is not to oppress Christians or to protect Muslims from conversion. From the standpoint of an ethnically-exclusive political party that thrives on division, this has proven to be a useful result.

If people do not feel politically motivated by ethnic or religious sentiment, there is no need to subscribe to a party such as Umno.

The Malay vote is now split three ways: between Umno, PAS and PKR. Therefore, Umno can no longer claim a monopoly on the Malay vote. In fact, there is now the possibility that Malays may even vote for DAP, because they are moved by political causes other than race, such as economic and social justice and political reform. Religious appeal thus offers an alternative strategy for Umno to reach out to its primary ethnic base.

On the one hand, the “Allah” issue drives a wedge between Malaysians of different faiths. On the other, it feeds a particular conspiracy theory that Umno successfully deployed during the last general election:

There is a sizable chunk of the rural Malay electorate that believes that a federal victory by Pakatan Rakyat will bring about the Christian takeover of Malaysia. This will also bring about Indian and Chinese domination over the Malays. Presumably, because Christians are already attempting to steal the name of “Allah”, they will by extension steal the special status of the Malay community.

Who will save the Malays from this conspiracy? Umno. But at what cost?

Pursuit of this kind of strategy has also been fuelled by electoral changes in the Barisan Nasional (BN). After years as ineffectual partners to Umno, the minority ethnic parties of the MCA, MIC, and Gerakan lost credibility with their respective constituencies and were all but wiped out since 2008. The BN became a coalition held up by Umno and its partners in Sabah and Sarawak, effectively making it a (multi-religious) bumiputera platform rather than a multi-ethnic one.

Umno also increased its electoral dominance in the 2013 general elections, winning 88 seats out of the BN’s 133, a full two thirds. In Parliamentary seats as well as in practice, Umno was truly first amongst theoretical equals.

There is talk that this electoral success has led some within Umno to the conclusion that a politics of inter-ethnic accommodation and moderation can be abandoned entirely and Umno can go it alone. This thesis also appears to be linked to the faction within Umno that has tried to depose Najib. Najib himself is hardly innocent of this approach to politics because he has implicitly accepted its gains and voiced no criticism of it.

However, excessive pursuit of this strategy of fostering inter-religious strife may backfire on Umno. Like it or not, Umno depends on its Sabahan and Sarawakian partners to hold a Parliamentary majority. The primary victims of the “Allah” controversy are Sabahan and Sarawakian Christians who worship in Bahasa Malaysia. They include supporters of Umno’s coalition partners. If Umno’s strategy continues unchecked, its Sabahan and Sarawakian partners may eventually find themselves punished with the kind of living political death inflicted upon MIC and MCA.

A counter-strategy?

The religious alarmist approach to politics has been powerful for Umno because Pakatan Rakyat has been hard pressed to find an effective counter to it.

Despite statements of protest made by Anwar Ibrahim and other leaders over the years, there have been no concrete remedial actions proposed until Anwar’s recent call for a “national consensus.”

In the absence of a clear counter-strategy, Pakatan leaders may also have been overly cautious in their past statements for fear of losing marginal Malay votes. Despite the importance of Sabah and Sarawak for holding Parliament, a mere 5 per cent swing in the Malay vote is sufficient to decide the fate of either coalition. There is a reasonable fear that poorly worded statements or those distorted by rival spin doctors, will cause Pakatan to be unfairly painted as an enemy of Islam.

Pakatan Rakyat has made a collective and progressive statement with regards to the use of “Allah”. The coalition has supported the right of adherents of all relevant faiths to use the name of their God.

However, the coalition leadership has not repeated the fact of their stance as often as they could have. It is not enough to say it once and hope that people will take note, or let alone remember. Repetition is crucial. Further diluting the message has been the contrary stance of the PAS Syura Council, although PAS President Hadi Awang has endorsed the inclusive Pakatan position.

The fact that the Selangor Menteri Besar took nearly a week to respond to the seizure of Bibles by Islamic authorities this January has also made Pakatan look irresolute on their stance. This may also have been a contributing factor to the “Kajang move.”

Malaysian politics at this time requires a stronger message of principle and solidarity to counter the forces of division.

A government willing to victimise part of its own population in order to further its narrow political ends is an abomination to modern democracy. Such an entity cannot possibly be entrusted with the future of the country. It is a thoroughly irresponsible politics.

The rural Malays who believe in a Christian takeover conspiracy are not reading the online alternative press where Pakatan Rakyat receives strong and relatively fair coverage. Reliance on mere statements is ineffective due to Pakatan Rakyat’s limited coverage in the mainstream media.

Gestures such as those taken by civil society to show solidarity with non-Muslims and their places of worship are also not enough. More urgent are initiatives to show Malay Muslims that non-Muslims are not a threat.

In this latter regard, both civil society and Pakatan Rakyat have fallen short. Feet need to go to the ground at the grassroots level, and this means logistics, strategy, and a clear counter-narrative.

Anwar’s recent step to push for a national consensus, followed days later by a justification of the ‘Kajang move’ in terms of countering inter-religious tension, suggest that momentum has finally arrived on the issue.

With this, for the first time in years, January in Malaysia has not been dominated by acts of religious incitement.

What fruit could be borne of the “Kajang move,” its strengths and weaknesses, will be considered in Part Two.

*Yin Shao Loong is Research Director of Institut Rakyat, www.institutrakyat.org

* This is a personal opinion of the columnist.